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Introduction 
A well-functioning environmental regulatory program makes the 
American people better off by protecting the air we breathe, water we 
drink, and food we eat. If markets work well in allocating resources, 
then government regulation is unnecessary. Indeed, government 
intervention in well-functioning markets will likely make society worse 
off by imposing costs that exceed their benefits. If markets do not work 
well, as evidenced by negative externalities such as pollution, then 
government regulation has the potential to remedy the market failure 
and make people better off. But such regulatory success is not 
guaranteed. A poorly designed regulation, even if motivated by a 
market failure, could result in costs that exceed its benefits and may 
exacerbate the welfare losses. A well-designed regulation, however, can 
improve the welfare of affected people and attempt to deliver what the 
market would if it were not suffering from negative externalities. 
Identifying the need for environmental regulation and crafting 
effective interventions has relied on assessments of regulatory impacts 
dating back to the Carter Administration.1 Since 1981, the Environ–
mental Protection Agency (EPA) has assessed the benefits and costs of 
its major regulatory actions.2 These assessments typically include 
monetized, quantified but not monetized, and qualitative character–
istics of the expected benefits and costs, which can address the 
fundamental economic question of regulatory policy: does the regulation 
 
1. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (Mar. 24, 1978) (creating 
a cost-effectiveness standard for new government regulations); Exec. 
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. p. 127 (1981) (repealing Executive Order 
12,044 and establishing the norm for the use of cost–benefit analysis as an 
input to regulatory decision-making); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. 
Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (superseding Executive Order 12,291). Since 
1993, Republican and Democratic Administrations have used Executive 
Order 12,866 to guide their analysis and review of executive-branch 
agency regulations. See, e.g., Susan E. Dudley, Happy Birthday, Executive 
Order 12,866!, Forbes (Sept. 24, 2018, 8:57 AM), https://www.forbes.com/ 
 sites/susandudley/2018/09/24/happy-birthday-executive-order-12866/ 
 #1bff51cf3eef (discussing presidential reliance on Executive Order 12,866 
over the past twenty-five years) [https://perma.cc/ZBV8-KENB]. 
2. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. p. 127 (1981) (defining a “major” 
rule as one with “[a]n annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more”); Exec. Order 12,866, at § 3(f)(1), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 
1993) (defining a “significant regulatory action” as one with “an annual 
effect on the economy of $100 million or more”); Congressional Review 
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 804(2)(A) (2018) (defining a “major” rule as one with “an 
annual effect on the economy of $100,000,000 or more”). In each of these 
three cases, there are also qualitative criteria for classifying a rule as 
“major” or “significant.” Exec. Order No. 12,291, at § 1(b)(2)–(3), 3 
C.F.R. p. 127 (1981); Exec. Order 12,866, at § 3(f)(2)–(4), 58 Fed. Reg. 
51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993); Congressional Review Act § 804(2)(B)–(C). 
Throughout this Article, I will use interchangeably “major,” “significant,” 
and “economically significant.” 
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increase social welfare? Of course, the EPA promulgates rules under a 
variety of statutory authorities,3 and a regulatory impact analysis can 
illustrate how a given regulatory action delivers on a statutory 
objective. In conducting analysis at the regulatory development stage, 
the EPA and stakeholders—through public comment on proposed 
rules—can identify less costly ways of achieving a societal goal. The 
evaluation of regulatory impacts, as well as prompt guidance from the 
external Science Advisory Board, can also inform the EPA’s research 
agenda so that the EPA, and, in turn, the public, can better understand 
the environmental and public-health benefits and costs to firms subject 
to agency regulations. 
EPA regulations may fall short of maximizing net social benefits, 
even if the Agency’s major rules typically produce monetized benefits 
greater than their monetized costs.4 The EPA promulgates regulations 
subject to its statutory authority, which in many cases places 
constraints on how it can design its regulation. A statute may prohibit 
an explicit consideration of benefits and costs in the design of reg–
ulations.5 Alternatively, a statute may prescribe the regulatory 
intervention and provide little discretion to the EPA.6 As a result, some 
regulations may fail to deliver a socially efficient level of environmental 
protection but nonetheless result in net social benefits. 
There may also be cases in which the social costs exceed the social 
benefits. In that case, regulatory impact analysis can highlight 
 
3. See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2018) (permitting the EPA to 
regulate air pollutants); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2018) 
(permitting the EPA to regulate water pollutants); Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9601 (2018) (permitting the EPA to regulate hazardous waste sites); 
Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g (2018) (permitting the EPA 
to regulate public water systems); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 2601 (2018) (permitting the EPA to regulate chemical substances 
and mixtures); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 
U.S.C. § 136 (2018) (permitting the EPA to regulate the use and manufacture 
of pesticides); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
6901–02 (2018) (permitting the EPA to regulate waste disposal). 
4. See, e.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the 
President, 2017 Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs 
of Federal Regulations and Agency Compliance with the 
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act 7 tbl.1-1 (2019) (summarizing the 
monetized benefits and costs of EPA’s major rules). 
5. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 464–71 
(2001) (finding that the text of the Clean Air Act precluded the EPA 
from considering costs when the Agency sets national ambient-air-quality 
standards). 
6. See e.g., Nicholas Z. Muller & Robert Mendelsohn, Efficient Pollution 
Regulation: Getting the Prices Right, 99 Am. Econ. Rev. 1714, 1732–37 
(2009) (explaining that, while the EPA has no discretion over the sulfur 
dioxide emission caps set under Title IV of the Clean Air Act, more 
stringent emission caps could have significantly increased social welfare). 
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opportunities for legislative reform. The EPA’s regulatory impact 
analyses of proposed rules typically provide rigorous evidence 
addressing key policy questions: Do regulations deliver on the nation’s 
environmental goals established in statute? Do they maximize net social 
benefits? Do they achieve their goals at the lowest possible cost? While 
the EPA has an impressive track record in undertaking prospective 
analyses of proposed regulations, the Agency, like many federal 
regulators, has a significantly weaker record in evaluating the per–
formance of existing rules.7 Every administration dating back to 
President Carter’s in 1978 has implemented some form of retrospective 
review of regulations; yet there is little doubt that the EPA dedicates 
less attention to retrospective review than it does to prospective 
review.8  
This is a critical issue in the context of environmental regulations. 
The EPA—or, in the case of carbon-dioxide-tailpipe and fuel-economy 
standards, the EPA and the Department of Transportation—has issued 
nearly one-third of all major federal regulations between 2007 and 2016.9 
These rules represent an even larger fraction of the monetized benefits 
and costs of federal regulatory actions. At least 80% of the prospective 
benefits and at least 66% of the prospective costs of federal regulations 
result from the EPA’s regulatory actions to improve the environment.10 
In addition, some environmental statutes authorize periodic review 
and updating, which could benefit from rigorous examination of the 
performance of the regulation in practice. For example, the Clean Air 
Act authorizes the EPA to review and revise, when necessary, the 
national ambient-air-quality standards for criteria pollutants, such as 
fine particulate matter and ozone, every five years.11 
To illustrates ways of rigorously evaluating the performance of 
environmental regulations, in this Article I focus on the lessons from 
 
7. See generally Joseph E. Aldy, Learning from Experience: An 
Assessment of the Retrospective Reviews of Agency Rules and 
the Evidence for Improving the Design and Implementation of 
Regulatory Policy (2014) (evaluating the retrospective review processes 
under the Obama Administration and previous administrations, and 
recommending certain improvements). 
8. But see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 
Stat. 2399 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7612 (2018)) (amending the Clean Air 
Act to require what are now known as Section 812 reports regarding the 
impact of the Act on the “public health, economy and environment of the 
United States”); EPA, EPA-410-R-97-002, Benefits and Costs of the 
Clean Air Act, 1970 to 1990: Retrospective Study, at ES-1–10 
(providing an assessment of the cumulative benefits and costs of the Clean 
Air Act from 1970 to 1990, but offering little information on the 
performance of specific Clean Air Act regulations). 
9. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, supra note 4.  
10. See id. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d) (2018). 
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the policy innovation of pollution markets under the Clean Air Act. 
While the EPA began experimenting with some more flexible 
approaches to air-quality-regulation compliance in the 1970s—such as 
the “netting” of emissions across new and existing sources within a 
facility and the opportunity for new emissions sources in non-attai–
nment areas to “offset” their emissions by reducing emissions at existing 
sources12—they were only mildly successful.13 The EPA expanded the 
role of market-based instruments in the 1980s, and cap-and-trade and 
tradable performance standards have played important roles in 
implementing ambitious reductions of lead in gasoline and sulfur 
dioxide and nitrogen oxides at power plants.14 
The ex post evaluations of the EPA’s air-pollution markets in the 
academic literature provide rigorous evidence about the environmental, 
public-health, and economic impacts of these rules. These studies 
inform regulators, legislators, stakeholders, and the public on the 
performance of one of the most significant policy innovations of the 
EPA’s first fifty years. Moreover, this research highlights credible 
approaches for estimating the causal impacts of environmental 
regulations that can inform how the EPA can plan for and design 
retrospective evaluations in future regulatory actions. 
The next Part synthesizes the academic literature on the 
performance of Clean Air Act pollution markets. Part II draws lessons 
for the design of pollution markets and Part III draws lessons for 
institutionalizing retrospective analysis in future regulatory develop–
ments. 
I. Performance of Clean Air Act Pollution Markets 
A. Types of Pollution Markets 
The two most common approaches to creating pollution markets 
under the Clean Air Act have been tradable performance standards and 
cap-and-trade programs.15 Tradable performance standards establish a 
rate-based standard—such as grams of a pollutant per gallon of gasoline 
or pounds of a pollutant per megawatt-hour of electricity—that serves 
 
12. See Robert W. Hahn, Economic Prescriptions for Environmental 
Problems: How the Patient Followed the Doctor’s Orders, 3 J. Econ. 
Pers. 95, 99 (1989). 
13. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, Policy Evolution under 
the Clean Air Act, 33 J. Econ. Pers. 27, 34–35 (2019) (discussing initial 
experiments with emissions trading in the 1970s, and the more successful 
efforts starting with the leaded gasoline phase-down in the 1980s). 
14. See id. at 35–40. 
15. Id. at 29–30; See also Nathaniel O. Keohane & Sheila M. Olmstead, 
Markets and the Environment (2007). 
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as the benchmark for trading.16 If a firm produces pollution at a rate 
below this standard, then it can generate credits that can be sold to 
other firms who may produce pollution at a rate above this standard. 
For compliance purposes, firms must demonstrate that a combination 
of their own performance and purchased credits satisfy the standard.17 
A secondary market for credits can arise in which the credit prices 
signal to firms opportunities for reducing pollution at lower cost. The 
quantity of credits generated and sold thus depends on the technological 
capacity of and economic incentive for firms to reduce their pollution 
and sell credits to other firms. 
A cap-and-trade program limits the aggregate emissions of 
regulated firms by establishing a fixed number of tradable emission 
allowances—equal to the program’s overall cap—which are typically 
allocated to firms either as a function of their historic emissions or via 
an auction.18 Firms may buy and sell allowances, but they must 
surrender allowances to the government to cover their emissions in 
order to comply with the program. The cap creates scarcity in the right 
to pollute, which drives the allowances’ prices on the secondary market 
where firms buy and sell the allowances. 
These pollution-market approaches may appeal to policymakers 
and regulators for a variety of reasons. First, pollution markets 
circumvent a fundamental information problem confronting the 
regulator. The firms responsible for air pollution typically have much 
better private information about their opportunities for abating 
pollution than the EPA does. They also lack an incentive to share this 
private, firm-specific information with the regulatory agency. As a 
result, the EPA cannot effectively target and tailor pollution abatement 
obligations on a firm-by-firm basis. Instead, the Agency typically 
imposes a one-size-fits-all technology or performance standard, which 
risks a high cost per unit of pollution abated.19 In pollution markets, 
the EPA avoids needing to learn information on a firm-specific basis 
because it recasts the task in order to deliver firm-specific incentives for 
reducing pollution. By pricing pollution implicitly through these 
markets, the EPA leverages the firm’s profit motive in a way that 
encourages the firm to collect information on pollution-abatement 
strategies and implement them. 
Second, in pricing pollution, these markets deliver strong incentives 
for firms to cost-effectively reduce their emissions. A firm may identify 
pollution-abatement opportunities that cost less than the going price in 
the allowance market and decide to reduce its emissions in order to 
profit from the sale of the allowances it no longer needs for compliance 
 
16. Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 13, at 31.  
17. Id. at 33.  
18. Id.  
19. Id. at 28–29. 
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purposes. A firm with high abatement costs would find that buying the 
allowances from this low-cost firm minimizes its compliance costs. 
Regardless of the initial allowance distribution, trading can result in 
emission allowances being put to their highest valued use: covering 
those emissions that are the costliest to abate, and spurring firms to 
undertake the least costly reductions.20 
Third, pollution markets promote innovation in new abatement 
technology that can both lower costs and increase the efficacy of 
reducing emissions. Under a technology standard, a firm has weak 
incentives for innovation once it has installed the mandated technology. 
Under a performance standard, a firm has some incentive to innovate 
to reduce costs, but little incentive to reduce emissions below the rate 
set by the standard. In contrast, pollution markets reward innovation 
because it can lower emissions that free up allowances for sale to other 
firms or lower costs that can likewise enable a firm to pursue additional 
abatement for less than the going price of allowances in the market. 
Finally, the political economy of the free allocation of allowances 
under cap-and-trade and the setting of the rate benchmark in a tradable 
performance standard may appeal to some policymakers.21 Emission 
allowances have value regardless of whether they are auctioned or given 
away for free, and regulated entities that may otherwise oppose a new 
regulatory approach could instead support one in which they receive 
these valuable allowances as a function of their historic emissions. 
B. Why Focus on the Clean Air Act’s Pollution Markets? 
The experience of pollution markets in reducing emissions of air 
pollutants holds important lessons about the record of the Clean Air 
Act over five decades as well as insights for future policy design. The 
experimentation with various approaches to trading under the Clean 
Air Act—with some early successes (e.g., the phase-down of lead in 
gasoline) and some failures (e.g., the rarely used project-specific trading 
for new sources in non-attainment areas)22—led to more extensive policy 
innovation. The emergence of pollution markets served as a counter to 
criticisms that Clean Air Act regulations were imposing excessive costs 
on American businesses. They also altered the political economy of 
long-simmering policy disputes, such as how to address the problem of 
acid rain, and created a path forward for more ambitious environmental 
goals. 
These lessons about effective policy design and implementation 
facilitated replication of pollution markets in many other contexts. 
 
20.  See generally Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, The Effect of Allowance 
Allocations on Cap-and-Trade System Performance, 54 J. Law Econ. 
S267 (2011). 
21. See Nathaniel O. Keohane et al., The Choice of Regulatory Instruments 
in Environmental Policy, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 313, 317–18 (1998). 
22. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 13; see also Hahn, supra note 12. 
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Indeed, one of the major legacies of the EPA’s implementation of the 
Clean Air Act is the testing of, learning about, and exporting the idea 
of leveraging pollution markets to deliver on environmental and energy 
goals. Policymakers at federal and state levels, as well as in 
governments around the world, have learned from these experiences 
with EPA pollution markets and they have implemented those lessons 
in the design of their policies. Tradable performance standards have 
become a common instrument for implementing U.S. energy policies, 
including corporate average fuel-economy standards,23 state renewable 
portfolio standards,24 and the California Low Carbon Fuel Standard.25 
Cap-and-trade programs have helped to implement carbon dioxide 
emission goals in California,26 in the northeast and mid-Atlantic states 
participating in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative,27 in the E.U. 
through the Emission Trading System,28 and in China.29 In 2019, the 
World Bank estimated that about 15% of global carbon dioxide 
emissions were covered by cap-and-trade programs or tradable 
performance standards.30 It's virtually impossible for a person anywhere 
in America to flip a light switch or fuel a car that has not been subject 
to a pollution market or market-based clean-energy policy.31  
 
23. See Benjamin Leard & Virginia McConnell, Emerging Evidence on the 
CAFE Credit Trading Program, Resources (Feb. 5, 2016), 
https://www.resourcesmag.org/common-resources/emerging-evidence-on-
the-cafe-credit-trading-program/ [https://perma.cc/LZV9-NC7J]. 
24. See Galen Barbose, Lawrence Berkeley Nat’l Lab., U.S. 
Renewables Portfolio Standards 7 (2019). 
25. See Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Ca. Air Resources Board, https:// 
 ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/programs/low-carbon-fuel-standard [https:// 
 perma.cc/DG9N-B86Y] (last visited June 25, 2020). 
26. See Cap-and-Trade Program, Ca. Air Resources Board, https:// 
 ww3.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/cap_trade_overview.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UD2F-KBZR] (last visited June 25, 2020). 
27. See Elements of RGGI, Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
https://www.rggi.org/program-overview-and-design/elements [https:// 
 perma.cc/PFG6-ACQP] (last visited June 25, 2020). 
28. See EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), European Commission 
https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets_en [https://perma.cc/YZ7W-GQGL] 
(last visited June 25, 2020). 
29. See William A. Pizer & Xiliang Zhang, China’s New National Carbon 
Market, 108 Am. Econ. Ass’n Papers & Proc. 463, 463, 465 (2018). 
30. See Céline Ramstein et al., WBG, State and Trends of Carbon 
Pricing 2019, at 14 (2019). 
31. See Joseph E. Aldy, Pricing Pollution through Market-based Instruments, 
in Handbook of U.S. Environmental Policy 202, 202 (David 
Konisky ed., 2020). 
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Pollution markets can serve as a key element of implementing a 
durable, long-term U.S. climate policy.32 While federal legislation has 
failed to deliver major carbon-dioxide-mitigation policy, Presidents 
Clinton,33 Bush (George W.),34 and Obama35 each advocated for carbon 
dioxide cap-and-trade as a cornerstone of their climate-change policy 
programs, either on the campaign trail or once in office. In his second 
term, President Obama advocated for, and the EPA promulgated, the 
Clean Power Plan to reduce power-sector carbon emissions by 
approximately one-third by 2030.36 This regulatory approach would 
have enabled states to implement their power-sector carbon goals 
through either a mass-based cap-and-trade program or a rate-based 
tradable performance standard. 
Finally, the extensive academic literature on the performance of 
pollution markets can provide lessons for other policies, as well as 
lessons for how the EPA can conduct retrospective analyses of future 
regulations. The research questions, empirical methods, and data 
collection in the peer-reviewed research literature highlight ways that 
the EPA can plan for and design ex post regulatory evaluations. The 
basic insight from the academic literature reflects an understanding 
that an appropriate research design could effectively mimic a 
randomized control trial. Since EPA cannot implement regulations as 
real-world randomized experiments with “treatment” groups and 
“control” groups, alternative quasi-experimental approaches can 
estimate the causal impacts of a regulation. The research literature 
employs an array of causal inference methods—difference-in-differences, 
matching estimators, regression discontinuity, instrumental variables 
models, synthetic control models, etc.—to distinguish between 
statistical correlations and causal impacts of regulations.37  
 
32. See Ann Carlson & Dallas Burtraw, Conclusion to Lessons from The 
Clean Air Act 225, 231 (Ann Carlson & Dallas Burtraw eds., 2019). 
33. See Joseph E. Aldy, Saving the Planet Cost-Effectively: The Role of Economic 
Analysis in Climate Change Mitigation Policy, in Painting the White 
House Green, 89, 94 (Randall Lutter & Jason F. Shogren eds., 2004). 
34. Id. at 109. 
35. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, 
A New Era of Responsibility: Renewing America’s Promise 21 (2009) 
(implementing a climate change and energy plan through a cap-and-trade 
system). 
36. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,665 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to 
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). 
37. See Aldy, supra note 7, at 17 for a further discussion and illustration of 
causal inference methods in the academic literature on retrospective 
analysis of regulations. See also generally John DiNardo & David S. Lee, 
Program Evaluation & Research Designs, in 4A HANDBOOK OF LABOR 
ECONOMICS 463–536 (2011); JOSEPH S. WHOLEY, HARRY P. HATRY, & 
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For example, difference-in-differences, the most common approach 
in the literature discussed below, focuses on two differences: the 
difference before and after the timing of a regulation and the difference 
between regulated (the “treatment”) group and an unregulated (the 
“control”) group. This latter group should be similar to the former 
group, except for the regulation. The first difference accounts for 
possible time trends that could bias the estimated impact of a 
regulation (e.g., technological innovation or economic growth) and 
would be common across the treatment and control groups. After taking 
this first difference, the second difference -- comparing the treatment 
group's change over time with the control group's change over time -- 
then isolates the impact of the regulation on outcomes of interest.  
In the discussion that follows, I first illustrate what has been 
learned about the environmental, public-health, and economic impacts 
of pollution markets. Then I review how these studies’ approaches to 
rigorously estimating impacts can inform future government efforts to 
assess regulatory performance. In drawing these insights, I focus on 
papers from the academic literature that employ causal-inference 
statistical models—i.e., analyses that enable a credible conclusion about 
the causal impacts, as opposed to associations with outcomes, of these 
pollution markets. 
C. Lead Credit Trading Program 
Since 1980, the ambient concentration of airborne lead in the 
United States has fallen by 99%.38 Given the significant adverse health 
impacts of lead exposure,39 this represents one of the greatest public 
health success stories of modern environmental law. The initial efforts 
to reduce lead in gasoline, however, were not primarily motivated by 
an understanding of lead’s public-health risks; rather the goal was to 
enable catalytic converters on light-duty vehicles to reduce tailpipe-
pollutant emissions.40 The EPA set limits on the lead content of gasoline 
through several regulations in the 1970s and early 1980s. In 1983, the 
EPA undertook a benefit–cost analysis that illustrated how more 
 
KATHRYN E. NEWCOMER, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICAL PROGRAM EVALUATION 
(3d ed. 2010).  
38. See Lead Trends, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/air-trends/lead-trends [https:// 
 perma.cc/JB6G-3LW5] (showing the decline of airborne lead) (last updated 
June 8, 2020). 
39. See Health Effects of Lead Exposure, Ctrs. for Disease Control, 
https://www.cdc.gov/nceh/lead/prevention/health-effects.htm [https:// 
 perma.cc/Q7A5-LPVD] (last updated Jan. 7, 2020). 
40. See Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in Economic Analyses at 
EPA: Assessing Regulatory Impact 49 (Richard D. Morgenstern ed. 
1997); Suzi Kerr & Richard G. Newell, Policy-Induced Technology 
Adoption: Evidence from the U.S. Lead Phasedown. 51 J. Indust. Econ. 
317, 320–24 (2003). 
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stringent lead standards could increase net social benefits.41 The 
resulting rule-making accelerated the phase-down of lead and imple–
mented these more ambitious goals through a tradable credit program.42 
The so-called averaging, banking, and trading program for lead 
represented the first real-world illustration of how market-based 
environmental policy can deliver on environmental objectives at lower 
costs.43 The EPA set a performance standard—measured as the mass of 
lead per volume of gasoline—that ratcheted down the permissible lead 
content over time.44 Initially set at 1.1 grams of lead per gallon, the 
EPA reduced the lead content limit to 0.5 grams of lead per gallon in 
1985, and then down to 0.1 gram of lead per gallon in 1986.45 Lead as 
a fuel additive was banned as of January 1, 1996.46 If a refiner reduced 
the lead in its gasoline to an amount below that year’s EPA standard, 
then it could generate tradable credits based on the product of its total 
gasoline production and the difference in its gasoline’s average lead 
content and that of the standard.47 The refiner could then sell those 
credits to another refiner whose gasoline’s lead content exceeded the 
EPA standard.48 Accounting for both the refiner’s own lead content and 
its net credit position served as the basis for demonstrating compliance 
with the standard. Refiners could also bank, or save, credits for use in 
a future compliance year, and some refiners did this in anticipation of 
higher compliance costs as the standards ratcheted down over time.49 
The tradable credit program for lead delivered substantial cost 
savings and incentives for technological innovation.50 As refiners 
removed lead from their gasolines, they had considerably diverse 
opportunities to modify their fuel specifications in order to ensure 
performance. That opportunity created an opening to exploit those 
gains from trade through a pollution market. It also enabled the EPA 
to eliminate a previous distinction in regulatory stringency between 
small and large refiners, because the typically higher-compliance-cost 
small refiners could now avail themselves of the tradable-credit market 
to avoid the high costs of satisfying the standard. The tradable-credit 
 
41. Nichols, supra note 40.  
42. Id. 
43. Richard Newell & Kristian Rogers, The Market-Based Lead Phasedown, 
in Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation 171 (Judy 
Freeman & Charles Kolstad eds., 2007).  
44. Id. at 172. 
45. Id. at 173. 
46. Id. 
47. Kerr & Newell, supra note 40, at 321–22. 
48. Id. at 322. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. at 340–41. 
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program likely saved refiners several hundred million dollars over 
several years.51 
The public-health benefits of accelerating the phase-down of lead 
through the tradable-credit program are likely much larger than 
originally anticipated by the EPA. In its 1983 benefit–cost analysis, the 
EPA estimated the value of public-health benefits ranged from two to 
eight billion dollars per year from 1985–1988.52 In 1997, the EPA 
concluded that “airborne lead emissions from all sectors were virtually 
eliminated by 1990,”53 and more than 94% of these emission reductions 
occurred because lead was eliminated from gasoline.54 With improved 
epidemiological research on lead since the 1980s, especially with respect 
to the neurologic and cardiovascular risks posed by lead exposure, the 
EPA estimated that the monetized benefits of reducing airborne lead 
concentrations exceeded $1.8 trillion from 1970–1990.55 More than two-
thirds of these benefits reflect reduced premature mortality, while 
higher IQs deliver about $400 billion, and reduced hypertensions yields 
about $100 billion in benefits.56 
D. Sulfur Dioxide Cap-and-Trade Program 
Since 1990, power plant emissions of sulfur dioxide (SO2) have 
fallen by 92%.57 A variety of market factors have played a role in this 
decline. Low natural gas prices, increased deployment of renewable 
sources, and slow demand growth have caused coal-fired power plant 
retirements and lower dispatch from operating coal units.58 To a lesser 
extent, environmental regulations such as the Cross-State Air Pollution 
Rule have played a modest role in reducing SO2 emissions over the past 
decade.59 From 1990–2010, however, the major reduction in power plant 
 
51. Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for 
Theory and Practice, 16 Ecology L.Q. 361, 387 (1989). 
52. Nichols, supra note 40, at 74. 
53. EPA, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act 17 (1997). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 52 (expressing benefit estimates in 1990 dollars). 
56. Id. 
57. See EPA Releases 2018 Power Plant Emissions Demonstrating Continued 
Progress, EPA (Feb. 20, 2019), https://epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-releases-
2018-power-plant-emissions-demonstrating-continued-progress [https:// 
 perma.cc/3CRB-3V77]. 
58. See Joshua Linn & Kristen McCormack, The Roles of Energy Markets 
and Environmental Regulation in Reducing Coal-fired Plant Profits and 
Electricity Sector Emissions, 50 RAND J. Econ. 733, 753–55 (2019); 
John Coglianese et al., The Effects of Fuel Prices, Environmental 
Regulations, and Other Factors on U.S. Coal Production, 2008–2016, 41 
Energy J. 55, 55 (2019). 
59. Coglianese et al., supra note 58, at 56–57. 
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SO2 emissions is due to the cap-and-trade program established in the 
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. 
To address the risks posed by acid rain, the 1990 Amendments set 
the goal of cutting SO2 emissions from fossil fuel power plants to one-
half their 1980 levels.60 The law established a two-phase approach to 
achieving this goal. Phase I would start in 1995 and would cover the 
largest 263 electricity generating units with the highest SO2 emissions; 
and phase II would start in 2000 and would expand coverage to virtually 
all utility-scale fossil fuel power plants in the country.61 More than 100 
phase II units took advantage of the opportunity to voluntarily opt into 
phase I.62 Each unit participating in phase I received emission allow–
ances granting the holder the right to emit one ton of SO2, based on 
the product of that unit’s average heat input from 1985–1987 (measured 
in millions of British thermal units (MMBTUs)) and an SO2 emission 
rate of 2.5 pounds per MMBTU.63 Aggregating all units participating 
in phase I yielded the annual emissions cap. A similar allowance 
allocation occurred during phase II, but with a lower SO2 emission rate 
of 1.2 pounds per MMBTU.64 
A secondary market for emission allowances emerged as power 
plants bought and sold allowances. A plant could observe the going 
price for SO2 allowances to determine if it would be economical to 
further reduce a unit’s emissions—if doing so cost less than the 
allowance price, which would create an additional profit opportunity by 
selling unused allowances—or to purchase allowances from another 
plant (if doing so cost less than abating its own emissions). 
During a three-month “true-up” period at the end of each year, a 
regulated unit surrendered emission allowances equal to its SO2 
emissions, as measured through so-called continuous emission mon–
itors.65 If a regulated unit held more allowances than emissions, it could 
bank an allowance for use in a future compliance period.66 During the 
 
60. Linn & McCormack, supra note 58, at 737. 
61. See Richard Schmalensee & Robert N. Stavins, The SO2 Allowance 
Trading System: The Ironic History of a Grand Policy Experiment, 27 J. 
Econ. Persp. 103, 105 (2013). 
62. See Juan-Pablo Montero, Voluntary Compliance with Market-Based 
Environmental Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Acid Rain Program, 107 
J. Pol. Econ. 998, 1006 (1999); Envtl. Def. Fund, From Obstacle 
to Opportunity: How Acid Rain Emissions Trading is Delivering 
Cleaner Air 5 (2000). 
63. A. Denny Ellerman et al., Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. 
Acid Rain Program 6–7 (2000). 
64. 1990 Clean Air Act Amendment Summary: Title IV, EPA, https://www 
 .epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/1990-clean-air-act-amendment-summary-
title-iv [https://perma.cc/Z9SR-H9D6] (last updated January 4, 2017). 
65. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 61, at 105. 
66. Id. 
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initial phase of the program, power plants reduced emissions below the 
annual caps, thereby building a large bank of allowances for use in the 
more stringently regulated second phase. Starting in 2003, the prospect 
of new air-quality regulations as well as a series of federal court 
decisions delivered a several-year period of high and volatile allowance 
prices. As new, more stringent regulations affected power plant SO2 
emissions, and provided less compliance flexibility than under the Acid 
Rain Program, the SO2 cap-and-trade program ceased to be binding on 
power plants.67 The Clean Air Interstate Rule, implemented in 2009,68 
and the subsequent Cross-State Air Pollution Rule, issued in 2011,69 
placed state- and source-specific limits on SO2 emissions; and by 2012, 
allowances prices were below one dollar per ton, having fallen from 
prices in excess of $1,000 per ton in the mid-2000s.70 
The SO2 cap-and-trade program represented a significant departure 
from conventional regulatory approaches, such as the mandate to install 
smokestack scrubbers on coal-fired power plants built after 1977 and 
traditional performance standards.71 Providing power plants the 
flexibility to explore and exploit the lowest-cost ways of reducing SO2 
emissions timed well with the deregulation of freight railroads, which 
enabled many midwestern power plants to burn low-sulfur coal from 
Wyoming.72 Gaining access to low-sulfur coal likely reduced by half the 
marginal abatement costs for phase I power plants, and, taking full 
advantage of the gains from trade, delivered about $800 million in 
annual cost savings relative to a command-and-control performance 
standard that would have delivered the same aggregate emissions.73 In 
practice, however, the novelty of trading and the potential adjustment 
costs, as power plants transitioned to cap-and-trade from conventional 
regulations, meant that electricity generating units failed to take full 
advantage of trading in the early years of the program. For example, 
analysis of the cost-savings during phase II of the program indicates 
 
67. Id. at 113. 
68. EPA, The Clean Air Interstate Rule: 2009 Emission, Compliance 
and Market Analyses 1 (2010), available at https://www.epa.gov/ 
 sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/cair09_ecm_analyses.pdf. 
69. Cross-State Air Pollution Final and Proposed Rules, EPA, https:// 
 www.epa.gov/csapr/cross-state-air-pollution-final-and-proposed-rules 
[https://perma.cc/N6VB-RZY5] (last updated July 10, 2017). 
70. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 61, at 114. 
71. See Curtis Carlson et al., Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What 
Are the Gains from Trade?, 108 J. Pol. Econ. 1292, 1293, 1296 (2000). 
72. See Meghan R. Busse & Nathaniel O. Keohane, Market Effects of 
Environmental Regulation: Coal, Railroads, and the 1990 Clean Air Act, 
38 RAND J. Econ. 1159, 1178 (2007). 
73. See Carlson et al., supra note 71, at 1293. 
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that cap-and-trade reduced compliance costs by several hundred million 
dollars per year relative to a conventional performance standard.74 
In addition to lowering costs relative to command-and-control 
regulation, the SO2 cap-and-trade program delivered substantial public 
health benefits. Indeed, like the experience with the lead credit trading 
program, advances in epidemiological research contributed to a better 
understanding of the program’s public-health benefits, especially in 
terms of reducing fine particulate matter concentrations that contribute 
to premature mortality. The annual benefits associated with reducing 
premature mortality could be as great as $100 billion, dwarfing by two 
orders of magnitude the ecosystem benefits associated with lower rates 
of acidification that initially motivated the program’s development.75 
E. NOX Budget Trading Program 
Since 1990, power plant emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOX) have 
fallen by 84%.76 Just as in the case of SO2, market forces have played 
a role in reducing NOX from coal-fired power plants, but the NOX 
Budget Trading Program drove significant NOX emission reductions. 
This program evolved from the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments’ 
creation of the Ozone Transport Commission (OTC), which aimed to 
address ozone pollution through a regional strategy focused on the 
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states.77 In 1999, the OTC’s twelve states 
and the District of Columbia launched the NOX cap-and-trade 
program, which covered NOX emissions during the May-to-September 
“ozone” season.78 The program allocated allowances for free to large 
stationary sources and the cap was set at about 25% below a forecast, 
counterfactual emissions level.79 
Given the advances in scientific research and atmospheric modeling, 
the EPA worked with the states to expand the NOX cap-and-trade 
program to cover nineteen states in the eastern half of the United States 
through what became known as the NOX Budget Trading Program. 
Under full implementation in 2004, the program covered approximately 
“2,500 electricity generating units and industrial boilers, though the 700 
coal-fired” power plants in the program represented 95% percent of the 
 
74. See H. Ron Chan et al., The Impact of Trading on the Costs and Benefits 
of the Acid Rain Program, 88 J. Envtl. Econ. & Mgmt. 180, 199 (2018). 
75. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 61, at 109–10. 
76. EPA Releases 2018 Power Plant Emissions Demonstrating Continued 
Progress, supra note 57. 
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7511c(a) (2018). 
78. See Joshua Linn, Technological Modifications in the Nitrogen Oxides 
Tradable Permit Program, 29 Energy J. 153, 157 (2008). 
79. Id. 
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pollution market’s NOX emissions.80 The NOX Budget Trading 
Program reduced power plant NOX emissions in the covered states by 
about 40%, resulting in a 6% reduction in mean ozone concentrations, 
and a 35% reduction in the number of high-ozone summer days.81 Like 
the OTC program, the NOX Budget Program capped emissions during 
the summer ozone season, and allowed regulated firms to buy, sell, and 
bank allowances.82 The program ceased in 2009, when the EPA replaced 
it with the Clean Air Interstate Rule.83 
The dramatic reductions in emissions and ozone concentrations 
contributed to substantial public health benefits. The NOX Budget 
Trading Program reduced premature mortalities in the participating 
states by about 1,975 deaths per summer,84 which, when evaluated at 
the EPA’s preferred statistical value of life, translates into nearly $18 
billion in benefits.85 By improving air quality, the program also reduces 
the need for individuals to undertake defensive efforts and expend 
resources on health care and pharmaceuticals to mitigate the risk posed 
by air pollution. Under this program, cleaner air resulted in an $800 
million-per-year reduction in such defensive expenditures.86 
F. RECLAIM Cap-and-Trade Program 
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments required those areas classified 
as “extreme” non-attainment for ambient ozone concentrations to 
implement “economic incentive programs” to reduce emissions of ozone 
precursors, such as NOX.87 Given the extreme non-attainment status 
for Los Angeles, the South Coast Air Quality Management District 
designed the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market, commonly referred 
to as RECLAIM, a cap-and-trade program covering NOX emissions at 
 
80. Olivier Deschênes et al., Defensive Investments and the Demand for Air 
Quality: Evidence from the NOx Budget Program, 107 Am. Econ. Rev. 
2958, 2963 (2017). 
81. Id. at 2959. 
82. See id. at 2963. 
83. See id. at 2963 n.7. 
84. Id. at 2960. 
85. The EPA uses a value of statistical life of $7.4 million in 2006’s dollars. 
Mortality Risk Valuation, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/environmental-
economics/mortality-risk-valuation#whatvalue [https://perma.cc/9ET4-
P562] (last updated Feb 8, 2018). This is equivalent to roughly $9.19 
million in 2018’s dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. Bureau Lab. 
Stat., https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=7400000&year1= 
 200606&year2=201806 [https://perma.cc/5BPL-WXMS] (last visited 
June 25, 2020). 
86. Deschênes et al., supra note 80, at 2958. 
87. 42 U.S.C. § 7511a(g)(5) (2018). 
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392 facilities in the greater Los Angeles area.88 The program covered all 
private entities with at least four tons of annual emissions (public 
facilities, such as police and fire stations, were excluded). These 
RECLAIM facilities represented about two-thirds of the area’s NOX 
emissions from stationary sources, and the non-RECLAIM sources of 
NOX emissions operated under command-and-control regulation.89 
Starting in 1994, the RECLAIM cap-and-trade program aimed to 
reduce NOX emissions at these regulated facilities by 75% by 2003, and 
to continue that limit through 2010.90 Each facility received free 
emission allowances as a function of their historic fuel consumption and 
technology characteristics. Regulated facilities could buy and sell 
emission allowances, but they could not bank them for use in a future 
year.91 In addition, RECLAIM established two zones—coastal and 
inland—and prohibited the sale of allowances from the inland zone to 
the coastal zone.92 
The early years of the program witnessed allowance allocations that 
did not bind the regulated firms, perhaps reflecting the political 
economy of easing regulated firms into a new program. As a result, the 
lax emissions cap resulted in low allowance prices before 1999. 
Allowance prices spiked during the 2000–2001 California electricity 
crisis, as power generation within the RECLAIM region increased well 
above past levels: an allowance that traded for about $2,000 per ton in 
January 2000 traded for more than $120,000 per ton in March 2001. 
Fourteen power producers exited RECLAIM in 2001, agreeing to pay a 
non-compliance fee and to adopt best available control technologies on 
existing generating units by 2004. These units rejoined RECLAIM in 
2007.93 
The RECLAIM program delivered significant reductions in NOX 
emissions. Meredith Fowlie, Stephen Holland, and Erin Mansur 
evaluated the performance of the RECLAIM program by matching 
RECLAIM-covered sources with similar facilities in nearby non-
 
88. See Meredith Fowlie et al., What Do Emissions Markets Deliver and to 
Whom? Evidence from Southern California’s NOx Trading Program, 
102 Amer. Econ. Rev. 965, 968–69 (2012). The RECLAIM market also 
covered sulfur dioxide emissions at forty-one facilities. EPA, An 
Evaluation of the South Coast Air Quality Management 
District’s Regional Clean Air Incentives Market—Lessons in 
Environmental Markets and Innovation 11 (2002). Most RECLAIM 
research has focused on the much larger NOX cap-and-trade RECLAIM 
program. See Fowlie et al., supra, at 968 n.10. 
89. See Fowlie et al., supra note 88.  
90. EPA, An Overview of the Regional Clean Air Incentives 
Market (RECLAIM) 2 (2006). 
91. Fowlie et al., supra note 88, at 969. 
92. Id. at 972 n.22. 
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attainment areas in the state and examining the change in emissions 
over time.94 While both RECLAIM and non-RECLAIM sources in their 
sample experienced falling emissions, they estimate RECLAIM facilities 
emissions fell about 20% percent relative to their match group over the 
first decade of the RECLAIM program.95 The spike in allowance prices 
during the California electricity crisis also suggests that emissions would 
have increased, potentially significantly, in the absence of the emission 
cap. 
The authors also explore whether hot spots arise in dispro–
portionately low-income and minority communities—a key concern for 
the environmental justice implications of market-based instruments. 
Exploiting census-block-level socio-demographic data and facility-level 
emissions data, they find no evidence of so-called “hot spots” or lower 
relative-emission reductions in areas near RECLAIM facilities.96 By 
exploring the spatial distribution of abatement activity under a cap-
and-trade program, such an analysis can complement the findings 
regarding how efficient the regulatory instrument is in reducing 
emissions by also illustrating the distribution of its benefits. 
G. Renewable Fuel Standard 
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) represents the first legislative 
action to create a regulatory authority under the Clean Air Act that 
explicitly targets carbon dioxide emissions.97 The RFS reflects both an 
initial effort to establish a national biofuels mandate (in the Energy 
Policy Act of 200598) and a subsequent effort (the Energy Independence 
and Security Act of 200799) that increases the volumetric goals while 
limiting the carbon intensity of biofuels. The 2007 revision of RFS 
included quite ambitious goals, with total biofuels ramping up to thirty-
six billion gallons by 2022, and several low-carbon goals that may 
comprise this total biofuel goal, including sixteen billion gallons of 
cellulosic ethanol, twenty-one billion gallons of advanced biofuels 
(which may include celluslosic ethanol), and biodiesel (with goals after 
2012 to be set through EPA rule-makings).100 Qualifying cellulosic 
ethanol must have at least 60% fewer carbon emissions per volume than 
 
94. Id. at 972–73 (explaining the authors’ empirical framework). 
95. Id. at 991. 
96. Id. at 989–90. 
97. See Joseph E. Aldy, Promoting Environmental Quality through Fuels 
Regulations: Lessons for a Durable Energy and Climate Policy, in 
Lessons from the Clean Air Act, supra note 32, at 159, 160. 
98. Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594. 
99. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545 (2018). 
100. See id. § 7545(o)(2)(B)(i). 
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conventional petroleum-based gasoline.101 To put these ambitious goals 
in context, U.S. gasoline consumption in 2018 amounted to about 143 
billion gallons.102 While this program intended to drive technological 
innovation and large-scale commercialization of low-carbon biofuels, 
including cellulosic ethanol, the RFS has failed to deliver: EPA has 
promulgated rules setting cellulosic ethanol volumes below their annual 
statutory goals for every year since 2010.103 
Under the RFS, the EPA assigns a renewable volume obligation 
(RVO) to each gasoline refiner, blender, and importer based on the 
product of each entities’ annual gasoline production and the applicable 
percentage of renewable fuels that the EPA sets each year (the EPA 
converts the national volumetric goals in the statute into entity-specific 
compliance quantities).104 To satisfy its RVO, an entity can buy credits 
(referred to as “RINs,” based on the unique Renewable Identification 
Number associated with each unit of biofuel) from biofuel suppliers or 
others who may have purchased such credits from biofuel suppliers, and 
annually surrender to the EPA RINs equal to their RVO.105 When an 
obligated entity blends a gallon of renewable fuel with conventional 
gasoline or diesel, the RIN is separated from the biofuel and it may be 
traded, banked, or surrendered to the government to demonstrate 
compliance.106 
The RIN market differed from previous Clean Air Act pollution 
markets along several important dimensions. First, the RIN market was 
characterized by a “buyer beware” approach that placed liability on all 
regulated parties with RVOs for acquiring or transferring fraudulently 
generated RINs.107 This reflected the fact that virtually none of the 
compliance entities—primarily petroleum refineries—generated any 
renewable fuels on their own, and the source of renewable fuel credits—
biorefineries—were not subject to the RVOs. In 2011, the EPA began 
to identify fraudulently generated RINs and it prosecuted several firms 
responsible for doing so.108 The emergence of such fraud, coupled with 
 
101. See id. § 7545(o)(1)(E). 
102. See Gasoline Explained, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., https://www.eia.gov/ 
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103. See 85 C.F.R. § 7016, 7020 (2020). 
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105. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 80.1425, 80.1430. 
106. See id. §§ 80.1427, 80.1429. 
107. Renewable Fuel Standard Renewable Identification Number (RIN) Quality 
Assurance Program, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,078, 42,079 (July 18, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 80). 
108. Id. at 42111; Regulation of Fuels and Fuel Additives: Changes to Renewable 
Fuel Standard Program, 75 Fed. Reg. 14,670, 14,731 (Mar. 26, 2010) (to 
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the buyer liability in the program, had a chilling effect on the market, 
reducing liquidity.109 To remedy this problem, the EPA promulgated a 
new rule that created a Quality Assurance Program to enhance 
confidence and liquidity in legitimate RINs.110 This program provided 
independent verification of RINs and absolved refiners and other 
compliance entities of any liability associated with the program-verified 
RINs they purchase for compliance obligations.111 In effect, the Quality 
Assurance Program converted the RFS into a seller-liability scheme, 
akin to the SO2 and NOX cap-and-trade programs described above. 
Second, in contrast to cap-and-trade programs that set clear annual 
emission targets, the cellulosic ethanol goals under the RFS have been 
characterized by persistent uncertainty. Under the 2005 and 2007 
energy bills authorizing the RPS, the EPA has the discretion to waive 
RFS goals on an annual and possibly recurring basis if it determines 
that there is inadequate domestic supply.112 Given the absence of 
meaningful cellulosic ethanol production, the EPA has waived every 
annual RFS goal for cellulosic ethanol and promulgated regulations 
setting new, annual targets. In the early 2010s, the EPA began setting 
significantly lower cellulosic ethanol targets at one-twentieth to one-
hundredth of the statutory goals.113 Thus, an annual rule-making 
process that makes consequential changes to what was a fifteen-year 
schedule of targets under the statute created significant uncertainty for 
both firms with compliance obligations and entrepreneurs considering 
investing in low-carbon biorefineries. In some cases, regulated entities 
do not learn of their RVOs until after the compliance year has ended. 
For example, in 2012, cellulosic biofuel production in the United States 
fell short of the EPA-revised goal. In response to a ruling by the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit that EPA had exceeded its 
statutory authority in setting a 2012 target inconsistent with what the 
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market could feasibly supply, the EPA reduced the requirements to the 
actual level of production for that year.114 
Third, the RFS includes a “safety valve” by giving firms the 
opportunity to purchase EPA-issued credits at a pre-determined price 
in lieu of buying RINs from a biofuel supplier.115 This effectively 
converts the RIN market from a quantity-based pollution market to a 
hybrid quantity-tax instrument through which regulated entities can 
effectively pay a tax (purchase the EPA-issued credits) in lieu of 
satisfying their RVO’s quantity requirement. This contrasts with, for 
example, the SO2 cap-and-trade program in which a regulated entity 
failing to have sufficient emission allowances to cover its emissions must 
pay a financial penalty ($2,000 per ton—a higher price by a factor of 
ten than allowance prices for most of the first decade of the program’s 
operation) and retire emission allowances to offset its excess emissions 
in the subsequent year.116 
While economists have long argued that hybrid price-quantity 
approaches to pollution markets can increase social welfare compared 
to quantity-only approaches,117 the design of the RFS’s safety valve 
failed to deliver much certainty to regulated firms. In any year that the 
EPA waives the statutory cellulosic ethanol requirements—i.e., sets 
new annual goals through regulation—the Agency must also make 
available for purchase cellulosic biofuel waiver credits to regulated 
entities.118 The statute directs the EPA to set waiver-credit prices as a 
function of wholesale gasoline prices,119 which vary significantly over 
time, thus resulting in significant variation in credit prices over time. 
For example, from 2010–2018, annual waiver prices ranged from $0.42 
to $2.00 per gallon.120 By conditioning waiver prices on volatile gasoline 
prices, the waiver-credit approach does not deliver much certainty or 
predictability to either the entities with compliance obligations or the 
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Choice in Environmental Policy, 2 Rev. Envtl. Econ. & Pol’y 152 (2008). 
118. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(7)(D)(ii). 
119. Id. 
120. See Annual Compliance Data for Obligated Parties and Renewable Fuel 
Exporters under the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) Program, EPA, 
https://www.epa.gov/fuels-registration-reporting-and-compliance-help/ 
 annual-compliance-data-obligated-parties-and [https://perma.cc/4NZ9-
SNQP] (last updated May 21, 2020). 
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entrepreneurs who may invest in new cellulosic ethanol refining 
capacity. 
The RFS cellulosic ethanol market presents a cautionary tale about 
the potential for pollution markets to reduce emissions from other 
sources, for instance, from carbon dioxide associated with the com–
bustion of transportation fuels. From 2010–2018, cumulative production 
of cellulosic ethanol used for compliance with the RFS totaled less than 
4% of the statutory volume goals set in the Energy Independence and 
Security Act of 2007.121 
II. Learning from Pollution Markets’ Experiences 
The rigorous ex post evaluations of the experience in implementing 
pollution markets for fuels, power plants, and large stationary sources 
under the Clean Air Act address a number of environmental, economic, 
and political economy questions. The following sub-parts pose many of 
these important questions and synthesize the key insights from the 
relevant literature. In drawing these lessons, this Part also highlights 
how the relevant studies employed causal-inference methods to credibly 
estimate the impacts of the pollution markets. This sets the stage for 
Part III, which describes how the academic literature can inform the 
design and implementation of ex post regulatory performance 
evaluation at the EPA. 
A. Do pollution markets minimize compliance costs? 
The standard theory of market-based instruments, such as cap-and-
trade and related pollution markets, notes that profit-maximizing firms 
have the discretion and flexibility to seek out and exploit the least 
costly ways of reducing emissions.122 If all firms operating under a cap-
and-trade program do just that, then marginal abatement costs are 
equated with allowance prices for all covered sources. This characterizes 
the cost-effective potential of a market-based approach to pollution 
control and has motivated the interest in pollution markets as 
alternatives to traditional command-and-control regulation. 
In practice, pollution markets have lowered compliance costs 
compared to conventional regulation but they have failed to deliver on 
the cost-effective ideal. In a variety of contexts, firms have failed to 
implement cost-minimizing compliance strategies. In their analysis of 
the initial phase of the SO2 program, Curtis Carlson, Dallas Burtraw, 
Maureen Cropper, and Karen Palmer found that about one-quarter of 
their observations deviated from least-cost compliance strategies.123 
 
121. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i). 
122. See Joseph E. Aldy and Robert N. Stavins, Using the Market to Address 
Climate Change: Insights from Theory and Experience, 141 Daedalus 
45, 51 (2012). 
123. See Carlson et al., supra note 71, at 1304, 1319. 
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They found that actual compliance in the SO2 market resulted in about 
$300 million more in costs than they estimated in their least-cost 
compliance scenario, which was based on their estimated marginal 
abatement cost functions.124 Likewise, under the NOX Budget Trading 
Program, some power plants’ investment in NOX-pollution-control 
equipment deviated from the least-cost abatement strategies.125 
Such deviations may reflect additional regulatory constraints, the 
nature of economic competition (more on this below), and political and 
legal uncertainties. For example, overlapping state-specific performance 
standards for SO2, as a part of states’ implementation plans, played a 
significant role in scrubber investments by power plants that were 
covered by the SO2 cap-and-trade program.126 The constraint imposed 
by the states’ requirements effectively precluded these power plants 
from exploiting the flexibility intrinsic to the cap-and-trade program. 
In effect, the resulting allowance price represents the residual demand 
for, and supply of, allowances conditional on the states’ regulatory 
requirements. 
B. How Much Have Pollution Markets Reduced Pollution? 
Pollution markets have played substantial roles in reducing 
pollution in many but not all applications. In the RECLAIM program, 
Meredith Fowlie, Stephen Holland, and Erin Mansur showed that 
emissions at facilities covered by the pollution market fell 20% 
compared to facilities that were otherwise similar except that they were 
regulated by conventional command-and-control regulations.127 In their 
analysis, they employ a difference-in-difference empirical strategy that 
looks at changes in emissions before and after the start of the 
RECLAIM program for both RECLAIM-covered sources and nearby 
sources that were covered by emission performance standards and then 
compares those changes. This approach can ensure that the estimated 
impacts are not confounded by some unobserved factors that evolve 
over time (e.g., economic activity, electricity demand, etc.) or 
unobserved, source-specific factors (e.g., better plant management). 
Olivier Deschênes, Michael Greenstone, and Joseph Shapiro 
exploited the timing, seasonality, and geographic coverage of the NOX 
Budget Trading Program to estimate significant 40% reductions in 
NOX emissions.128 Their empirical strategy effectively compared the 
 
124. Id. at 1318. 
125. Meredith Fowlie, Emissions Trading, Electricity Restructuring, and 
Investment in Pollution Abatement, 100 Am. Econ. Rev. 837, 842 (2010). 
126. See Elaine F. Frey, Technology Diffusion and Environmental Regulation: 
The Adoption of Scrubbers by Coal-Fired Power Plants, 34 Energy J. 
177, 178, 180 (2013). 
127. See Fowlie et al., supra note 88, at 991. 
128. See Deschênes et al., supra note 80, at 2959. 
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change in emissions at power plants across seasons (ozone season, when 
the program is in effect, versus non-ozone season), time (pre- versus 
post-2003 emissions), and geography (plants in the states covered by 
the program versus those that were not).129 This so-called “triple-
differencing,” an extension of difference-in-differences, enables a 
credible estimation of the causal impacts of the policy. 
In contrast, the RFS delivered only a very small fraction of the 
statutory goals for cellulosic ethanol, the low-carbon alternative.130 In 
addition, it is important to recognize the potential role that market 
forces can play in driving down emissions. In recent years, low natural 
gas prices, lower-than-expected electricity demand, and investment in 
wind and solar power, have all contributed to coal-fired power plant 
retirements and lower capacity utilization rates.131 The net result is 
significantly lower SO2 and NOX emissions over the past decade, with 
environmental regulations contributing much less than market forces to 
these changes. 
C. Do Cost-Effective Emission Reductions Potentially Increase Damages? 
Several of the most prominent pollution markets, including the SO2 
cap-and-trade program and the NOX Budget Program, cover pollutants 
that do not mix uniformly across their regulatory jurisdictions. As a 
result, two sources could trade emission allowances—with the seller 
emitting one ton less and the buyer emitting one ton more—and in 
doing so the public health benefits may change. If the buyer is in a 
densely populated area but the seller is in a sparsely populated area, 
then the trade could reduce the benefits of the policy. For example, 
Meredith Fowlie found that, under the NOX Budget Trading Program, 
the emission sources that made pollution-abatement investments 
tended to be farther away from major population centers than the 
emission sources that tended to purchase allowances.132 
In the context of the SO2 cap-and-trade program, Nicholas Muller 
and Robert Mendelsohn employed an integrated assessment model that 
accounts for the location of emissions, atmospheric chemistry, pollution 
transport, and the economic value of public-health impacts to show 
dramatic discrepancies—in some cases, by several orders of mag–
nitude—in the premature mortality damages caused by one ton of SO2 
 
129. Id. at 2969. 
130. See supra text accompanying note 121.  
131. See generally Linn & McCormack, supra note 58 (modeling how market 
shocks and emissions regulations affect emissions levels, profits, and coal-
fired plant retirement); Coglianese et al., supra note 58 (finding that the 
most significant contributor towards declining coal production was the 
relative decline in natural-gas prices compared to coal prices). 
132. See Fowlie, supra note 125, at 861, 863. 
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emissions.133 Ron Chan, Andrew Chupp, Maureen Cropper, and 
Nicholas Muller evaluated the economic, environmental, and public-
health impacts of phase II of the SO2 cap-and-trade program.134 They 
also compared the performance of the program to two policy 
counterfactuals: (1) a uniform performance standard, and (2) a variant 
of the SO2 cap-and-trade program in which plants receive SO2-
program-type allowances, but they could not sell their allowances.135 
They found that the uniform performance standard resulted in the 
highest public-health damages of the three policies.136 Since trading 
under the SO2 cap-and-trade program tended to shift emissions toward 
more densely-populated areas, the no-trade counterfactual resulted in 
lower public-health damages than the SO2 program. 
Muller and Mendelsohn suggest that a way to address the concern 
that emissions trading could increase public-health damages would be 
to institute trading ratios between any pair of sources based on the 
relative damages associated with one ton of emissions at these sources.137 
They estimated that such trading ratios could improve social welfare 
by nearly $1 billion per year compared to the ton-for-ton trading in the 
SO2 cap-and-trade program.138 Such differentiation in cap-and-trade 
implementations raises questions, however, about administrative 
feasibility and accuracy in estimating ratios, especially in the presence 
of a complicated atmospheric chemistry.139 
D. How do Imperfectly Competitive Markets Influence Pollution-Market 
Performance? 
The nature of market competition can influence how regulated firms 
respond to air-quality regulations. Accounting for this potential 
interaction is important for retrospective analysis, especially consid–
ering that most of the EPA’s prospective analyses of regulatory 
compliance costs rely on cost studies that abstract from market 
structure and market competition. And it is of particular importance 
given the frequency that the EPA has designed pollution markets that 
cover entities that operate in imperfectly competitive markets. Some 
power plants have local monopolies subject to economic regulation by 
state public utility commissions. Firms in some pollution-intensive 
industries, such as petroleum refining, can exercise local market power 
 
133. See Muller & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 1727. 
134. See H. Ron Chan et al., supra note 74, at 181–82. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 183. 
137. See Muller & Mendelsohn, supra note 6, at 1727–28. 
138. Id. at 1734. 
139. For a discussion of these potential limitations, see Art Fraas & Randall 
Lutter, Commentary on Efficient Pollution Regulation: Getting the Prices 
Right, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 602, 605–06 (2012). 
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in part due to the high costs of entry. And compliance strategies may 
draw on inputs subject to market power, such as the rail shipping 
duopoly associated with moving low-sulfur coal from the Powder River 
Basin to midwestern power plants. 
The evolution of the power plant regulatory landscape over the late 
1990s and early 2000s had important implications both for the impacts 
of regulations and for their evaluation. For example, Meredith Fowlie 
showed how power plants in restructured power markets responded 
differently to the NOX Budget Program than those that were subject 
to economic regulation.140 She finds that the power plants in the latter 
category were more likely to invest in more costly and more efficacious 
pollution-control equipment.141 As a result, power plants in competitive 
electricity markets tended to emit more NOX, and potentially expose 
more people to higher ozone concentrations, given the positive relation–
ship between deregulated markets and population density (as noted 
above). This bias toward capital-intensive environmental compliance 
by economically regulated power plants is an illustration of the Averch 
Johnson effect.142 In an assessment of coal-fired power plants’ com–
pliance under the SO2 cap-and-trade program, Steve Cicala finds that 
the power plants in economically regulated markets were also more 
likely to adopt scrubbers instead of less capital-intensive compliance 
strategies, such as switching to low-sulfur coal.143 
The interaction of market power and air-quality regulations can 
influence the economic incidence of pollution markets. Consider the case 
of the SO2 cap-and-trade program. One of the key factors in driving 
the low-cost compliance with the SO2 caps was the availability of low-
sulfur coal from Wyoming. With the deregulation of rail shipping, the 
Powder River Basin’s low-sulfur coal became an appealing compliance 
strategy for many midwestern coal-fired power plants. As Meghan 
Busse and Nathaniel Keohane showed, the freight rail duopoly that 
emerged over this time period was able to engage in price discrimination 
on the basis of environmental regulation and geographic location and 
to secure some of the economic rents created by the cap-and-trade 
program.144 To investigate this, the authors employed a difference-in-
differences empirical strategy that exploited the variation in regulatory 
status in the 1990s. They compared phase I plants covered by the cap-
 
140. Fowlie, supra note 125, at 863. 
141. Id. 
142. See The Averch Johnson Effect, Pa. State. Univ. e-Educ., https:// 
 www.e-education.psu.edu/ebf483/node/681 [https://perma.cc/SHC4-2UCV] 
(last visited June 25, 2020).  
143. See Steve Cicala, When Does Regulation Distort Costs? Lessons from Fuel 
Procurement in US Electricity Generation, 105 Am. Econ. Rev. 411, 
440–41 (2015). 
144. See Busse & Keohane, supra note 72, at 1160. 
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and-trade program starting in 1995 with a set of control plants that 
were subject to conventional command-and-control regulations during 
the entire 1990–1999 study period.145 The ability of a railroad to raise 
prices depends on the extent of competition it faces in delivering coal 
to any given power plant. In general, a railroad faces less competition 
for nearby power plants and more competition for more distant plants. 
Their analysis accounts for the nature of competitive pressures by 
examining pricing of coal deliveries as a function of shipping distances 
from coal mines to power plants. 
While overall coal prices fell during the latter half of the 1990s, 
Busse and Keohane found that delivered prices rose for plants covered 
by phase I of the SO2 cap-and-trade program relative to those still 
operating under command-and-control regulation; and prices rose more 
at plants near a low-sulfur coal source.146 Overall, they estimate that 
railroads enjoyed an increase in producer surplus of more than $40 
million, which represented about 15% of the economic surplus created 
by the cap-and-trade program.147 
While market competition may influence firm compliance behavior 
with an air-quality regulation, there may be additional interactions with 
welfare implications. In their evaluation of firm behavior in the southern 
California RECLAIM market, Jonathan Kolstad and Frank Wolak 
showed that some firms traded allowances in order to exploit market 
power in the California electricity market.148 They examined how the 
firms that own power plants both inside and outside the scope of the 
RECLAIM program paid more for NOX allowances during the 2000–
2001 California electricity crisis in order to justify higher power bids. 
As a result, higher electricity prices cleared in the wholesale power 
market, increasing the revenues for all electricity the firm generated (by 
RECLAIM- and non-RECLAIM-regulated units). Thus, the NOX cap-
and-trade market served as a leverage point for market power in the 
associated market for electricity. 
E. What Happens to Pollution Markets Subject to Shocks? 
Pollution markets have been subject to considerable allowance-price 
volatility. For example, SO2 and NOX allowance prices were more 
 
145. Id. at 1161–62. 
146. Id. at 1174. 
147. Id. at 1176. 
148. See Jonathan T. Kolstad & Frank A. Wolak, Using Environmental 
Emissions Permit Prices to Raise Electricity Prices: Evidence from the 
California Electricity Market 15 (Univ. of Cal. Energy Inst. Ctr. for the 
Study of Energy Mkts., Working Paper No. 113, 2003), https://www 
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volatile than crude oil prices over comparable time periods.149 During 
the mid-2000s, SO2 allowances increased nearly ten-fold before collap–
sing, as power plant managers responded to a variety of regulatory 
proposals and court rulings.150 In the RECLAIM market, the price of 
allowances increased by 100-fold from 2000–2001 during the California 
electricity crisis, which increased demand for power from pollution-
intensive electricity generating units.151 
Such uncertainty may influence a firm’s behavior, as it waits to 
learn more information before undertaking major, long-lived pollution-
control-equipment investments.152 The intrinsic uncertainty in quantity-
based pollution markets, including cap-and-trade and tradable credit 
programs, may result in higher compliance costs than a policy approach 
that provides greater cost certainty. Indeed, the evidence of cost-
effectiveness anomalies in a wide array of pollution markets is consistent 
with this adverse effect of uncertain allowance prices.153 The standard 
policy remedy advanced by economists is to modify the pollution 
market so that it operates like a hybrid instrument that converts to a 
tax—i.e., it provides price certainty—when allowance prices are 
unexpectedly high.154 The RFS program, however, shows how the 
implementation of such an approach is critical. Without sufficient lead 
time and predictability, firms may not benefit from hybrid price-
quantity approaches to pollution markets. 
F. What Are the Labor Market Impacts of Pollution Markets? 
While labor market impacts typically receive little attention in 
prospective analyses of regulations, the potential for a regulation to 
increase or decrease employment is politically salient.155 Several studies 
have explored the employment impacts of pollution markets and found 
that the direct impacts on regulated electric utilities may be modest, 
but the effects on energy-intensive manufacturing industries that 
consume power regulated by pollution markets may be more signi–
 
149. See Joseph E. Aldy & W. Kip Viscusi, Environmental Risk and Uncertainty, 
in 1 Handbook of the Economics of Risk and Uncertainty 601, 
629 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014). 
150. See Schmalensee & Stavins, supra note 61, at 114. 
151. See Fowlie et al., supra note 88, at 969–70. 
152. See Aldy & Viscusi, supra note 149, at 628. 
153. See Joseph E. Aldy & Sarah Armitage, The Cost-Effectiveness Implications 
of Carbon Price Certainty, 110 Am. Econ. Ass’n Papers & Proc. 113, 
115 (2020). 
154. See generally Goulder & Parry, supra note 117. 
155. See generally Does regulation kill jobs? (Cary Coglianese et al. eds., 
reprt. ed. 2015). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 4·2020 
Evaluating Regulatory Performance 
999 
ficant.156 These labor-market impacts should also be considered in the 
context of adverse employment outcomes associated with conventional 
command-and-control regulations under the Clean Air Act.157 
Ann Ferris, Ron Shadbegian, and Ann Wolverton studied the 
employment impacts of the SO2 cap-and-trade program on power 
plants covered by phase I of the program.158 The authors employ a 
difference-in-differences empirical strategy that exploits variation over 
time and in regulatory coverage. In effect, the authors compare the 
labor-market outcomes of plants “treated” in phase I with a set of phase 
II plants that are otherwise similar to serve as “control” observations.159 
The authors find no statistical evidence of changes in employment 
under the program.160 Likewise, they find no employment impacts when 
focusing on various, specific compliance strategies.161 These results are 
consistent with the labor demands of pollution-control compliance 
offsetting the effect compliance has on labor through productivity or 
output effects. 
Mark Curtis focused his analysis on the labor market impacts of 
the NOX Budget Trading Program.162 He likewise exploits variation 
across states and over time, but he also accounts for variation in the 
energy intensity of manufacturing industries, given the larger com–
pliance costs associated with the more energy-intensive (and hence, 
pollution-intensive) industries.163 He finds that the states covered by the 
NOX Budget Trading Program, after the cap-and-trade program began, 
witnessed a 1.3% decline in manufacturing employment (a loss of about 
 
156. Compare Rolf Färe et al., Environmental Regulatory Rigidity and 
Employment in the Electric Power Sector, in Does Regulation Kill 
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110,000 jobs) with larger employment reductions, of nearly 5% percent, 
in the most energy-intensive industries. In examining labor market 
flows, Curtis shows that the reductions in employment fell dispro–
portionately on younger workers, with falling hiring rates contributing 
more to the employment impacts than increasing separation rates.164 
G. How Have Pollution Markets Adapted to New Information? 
The Clean Air Act has endured over fifty years in part because it 
is designed to adapt to new information about pollution, health risks, 
and the technological options for mitigating pollution-related health 
risks.165 For example, the EPA used its discretionary authority to 
accelerate the phase-down of leaded gasoline in the 1980s through a 
tradable credit program. Adapting to emerging knowledge about the 
adverse impacts of lead exposure in the epidemiological literature, the 
EPA delivered significant public-health benefits through these 
discretionary rule-makings. 
In contrast, the Clean Air Act prescribed a specific approach to 
setting emission caps under the SO2 cap-and-trade program, limiting 
the EPA from adjusting the emission caps over time. Since the 1990 
Amendments, a significant improvement in epidemiological research has 
highlighted how reducing power plants’ sulfur emissions contributes to 
lower fine particulate matter concentrations and lower rates of 
premature mortality.166 Indeed, retrospective analyses of the SO2 cap-
and-trade program indicate that the EPA could have delivered larger 
public-health benefits and increased social welfare by tightening the 
program’s emissions caps.167 
The opportunities for learning and adapting policies to new 
evidence about the efficacy, effectiveness, distributional, and related 
impacts of air-quality regulations have improved with advances in 
research methods and data collection. As described above, innovations 
in statistical methods have enabled rigorous estimation of the causal 
impacts, as opposed to associations, of pollution markets. Integrating 
information on pollution-market design and implementation with high-
frequency, geographically specific data on pollution, health outcomes, 
individual behavior, firm behavior, and other information can produce 
the assessments that can inform regulators, key stakeholders, and the 
public about ways to improve air-quality policy over time. 
 
164. Id. 
165. See Ann Carlson & Dallas Burtraw, Introduction to Lessons From The 
Clean Air Act, supra note 32, at 1, 3. 
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III. Institutionalizing Retrospective Analysis 
The extensive academic literature on the Clean Air Act’s pollution 
markets, and in particular the causal inference research that credibly 
estimates the impacts of these policies, provide some important insights 
for how the EPA might design and implement retrospective analysis of 
its regulatory program. Before illustrating how to institutionalize 
retrospective analysis as a critical component of regulatory performance 
evaluation, the next sub-part makes the case for why such evaluations 
are needed. 
A. The Need for Retrospective Analysis 
Policymakers, stakeholders, and the public can each benefit from a 
credible and rigorous evaluation of regulatory performance. Indeed, this 
has motivated the EPA’s longstanding approach to subjecting its 
guidance for economic analysis to external peer review by its Science 
Advisory Board.168 Likewise, the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB) has pushed for the best, most up-to-date peer-reviewed science 
to inform agency actions.169 Designing a framework for evaluating 
regulations in line with three key principles can help ensure its 
credibility. First, a regulatory evaluation system should be transparent. 
This is consistent with soliciting public comments on proposed 
regulations and regulatory impact assessments.170 Providing access to 
analyses and communicating their impacts to the public and 
policymakers in a non-technical manner can enhance confidence that 
regulatory actions are delivering on statutory goals and improving 
social welfare. Or, in those cases where regulations fall short of 
regulatory objectives, these retrospective analyses can help identify new 
ways of delivering on these objectives. 
Second, a regulatory evaluation system’s framework should be 
rigorous. The best peer-reviewed empirical methods—including causal 
inference techniques in the program evaluation literature—should serve 
as a high, default standard for regulatory evaluation.171 Such quasi-
experimental methods can establish statistically appropriate 
 
168. For example, the EPA has solicited a review of its latest revision to its 
Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses. See Sci. Advisory Bd., 
EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses (2020). 
169. See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, 
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170. See Exec. Order No. 12,866, at § 6(a)(3)(E), 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735  
(Sept. 30, 1993). 
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Air Act (Resources for the Future, Working Paper No. 20-01, 2020) 
(evaluating retrospective Clean Air Act literature), https://scholar.harvard 
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counterfactuals, which may enable analysts and consumers of analysis 
to distinguish the outcomes caused by regulations from those that may 
be associated with regulations. There may be regulatory contexts that 
are not amenable to quasi-experimental approaches. In such cases, 
structural industrial-organization models may serve as an alternative 
evaluative framework.172 There may also be value in estimating 
empirically key parameters that a regulator would use to update its 
model of a regulatory context. 
Finally, an evaluation scheme should be replicable. The analytic 
frameworks and statistical methods should be sufficiently transparent, 
and the necessary data made publicly available, so that interested 
scholars, stakeholders, and others may replicate the agency’s analyses.173  
It may not be feasible to undertake ex post evaluations of every 
current rule because agencies have scarce resources for evaluating 
regulations.174 Evaluations should be prioritized by the cases in which 
the societal returns are expected to be the greatest. For example, 
economically significant regulations with large prospective benefits or 
cost estimates may make better targets for performance evaluation than 
smaller, economically insignificant rules. Some rules may be subject to 
periodic review and updates under their statutory authorities and thus 
a retrospective analysis would naturally inform the next iteration of 
regulatory standards. There may also be cases in which a regulatory 
evaluation yields significant knowledge that spills over to related 
regulatory contexts; the lessons from one rule could inform the 
evaluation and potential design of others. Finally, large changes in 
economic conditions, the evolution of social norms, or technological 
change may influence the performance of a regulation, thus meriting a 
rigorous review. 
The political nature of retrospective analysis—reflected in the calls 
by Presidents over the past four decades to review existing 
regulations—suggests that regulatory performance evaluations can 
address important political economy considerations as well. For 
example, during the Obama Administration, the OMB highlighted the 
following objectives for implementing retrospective review at regulatory 
agencies: 
When implementing their retrospective review plans, agencies 
should give high priority to those reforms that will promote 
economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and/or job 
creation. These high-priority reforms should include those with 
the greatest potential to produce significant quantifiable cost 
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savings and significant quantifiable reductions in paperwork 
burdens. Agencies should give special consideration to reforms 
that would reduce, simplify, or harmonize regulatory or reporting 
requirements imposed on small businesses.175  
This guidance focuses on reducing costs and related regulatory 
burdens as opposed to increasing net social benefits, and addresses 
specific distributional consequences, such as the impacts on small 
businesses. Accounting for such political-economy considerations may 
enhance the political salience of and support for retrospective review, 
which may be necessary to ensure its durability. The checkered track 
record of past retrospective review initiatives illustrates the need to 
leverage political interest to sustain a rigorous approach to regulatory 
performance evaluation. 
B. Planning for Ex Post Analysis of Regulations 
The EPA could establish at the rule-writing stage a framework for 
retrospective analysis of a regulation. This would include the 
development of a research plan that could be incorporated into a final 
rule’s preamble, which would highlight for the public and affected 
stakeholders the importance of the review and the Agency’s intent to 
undertake the review in the future. The research plan would explicitly 
identify the intended objectives and outcomes of the regulation that 
would serve as the measures to be evaluated. The plan would also 
describe the evaluative methods the Agency expects to employ, with an 
emphasis on data-driven experimental or quasi-experimental designs, 
where feasible. The EPA may also identify the key assumptions 
underlying the expected analyses, as well as how they map onto the 
prospective analyses. The timeframe of and the opportunities for public 
engagement on the retrospective analysis could also be elaborated in 
the research plan. 
The Agency should develop a data-collection protocol consistent 
with the data needs of the research plan. It is quite common for the 
EPA, like other regulators, to collect information only on regulated 
entities without considering necessary information about unregulated 
entities or populations that could serve as credible counterfactual 
controls in the empirical evaluation. The data-collection protocol could 
also establish ways to cleanly match data collected by the Agency with 
relevant data collected by other federal agencies, such as the 
Department of Energy, the National Center for Health Statistics, and 
the Bureau of the Census. 
The design of the research plans for ex post, regulatory performance 
evaluation should incorporate the causal-inference methods presented 
above. Such quasi-experimental methods may require creativity on the 
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part of both analysts and rule-writers to ensure that the 
implementation occurs in a manner than can enable a credible 
identification of the regulation’s impacts. As reflected in scholarly work, 
and in the parlance of an experiment, Clean Air Act regulations often 
create “treatment” groups (regulated entities, populations in non-
attainment areas, etc.) that are similar to “control” groups except for 
their regulatory status.176 These distinctions can serve as the basis for 
a research plan. 
To be more explicit, the EPA should consider designing regulations 
in ways that facilitate rigorous ex post evaluation. Variations in 
regulatory coverage by geography, industry, season, year, or the 
regulated entity’s size each create plausible opportunities for 
statistically identifying the impacts of a regulation. Granting flexibility 
in state and local implementation of a federal rule—which occurs in a 
variety of environmental statutes implemented by the EPA—may 
create quasi-natural experiments for rule evaluation as well. 
Finally, the data collected for the retrospective analyses should be 
made available for research and analysis by researchers, stakeholders, 
and members of the general public. This would enable the replication 
of the Agency’s work, enhancing its credibility. Such public disse–
mination would also extend the analysis—through leveraging extra-
governmental skills and expertise—in directions that could illuminate 
more efficient and effective approaches the regulator could pursue in 
the future.  
C. Targeting Rules for Retrospective Analysis 
Given the scarce resources and bureaucratic barriers to institution–
alizing retrospective analysis, the EPA could consider targeting for 
retrospective analysis those rules for which regulatory performance 
evaluation would yield the greatest social benefits. This would be 
conceptually similar to the standard that a full regulatory impact 
analysis should be undertaken for proposed rules with at least $100 
million in economic impacts.177 The following four illustrations could 
help to identify priority rules for retrospective analysis. 
First, ex post evaluation of a given regulation may create positive 
learning spillovers for other rules. For example, the extensive use of 
cap-and-trade policies for a variety of air pollutants in the United States 
and around the world reflects, to some degree, the positive evaluations 
of SO2 cap-and-trade program’s performance. The lessons from those 
evaluations then reflects a fixed cost that can be spread over multiple 
policy contexts. 
Second, a rule with large or uncertain benefits and costs in the 
prospective regulatory impact analysis may warrant rigorous 
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performance evaluation. Resolving uncertainties may help ensure public 
support for a regulation with positive net social benefits, or it may 
signal that a rule should be revised if it has significant, negative net 
social benefits. In such a case, the value of information could be 
considerably greater than the cost of producing it. For example, a 
rigorous assessment of the cellulosic ethanol component of the RFS 
would show that it yields virtually zero carbon dioxide emission-
reduction benefits and that it merits a significant revision, if not by the 
EPA—given the constraints under current law—then by Congress. 
Third, the EPA could focus retrospective analysis on rules subject 
to, or related to, periodic review and updates under the Clean Air Act. 
For example, the Agency regularly reviews the national ambient air-
quality standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants. While such 
reviews typically focus on the latest public-health research, they could 
be expanded to include institutionalized retrospective analysis to assess 
the impacts, especially in terms of the public-health benefits, of the 
current NAAQS. This information could improve the quality of the 
regulatory impact analysis for the NAAQS rule-making, as well as 
subsequent regulations that implement the NAAQS. For example, the 
NOX Budget Trading Program and the RECLAIM pollution markets 
were each developed to address ozone non-attainment. 
Finally, rigorous performance evaluation may be quite informative 
when the EPA employs a novel policy approach. It may be quite 
instructive to plan for and implement a retrospective analysis of this 
initial experimental effort to determine whether it should be used in 
additional contexts. 
Conclusion 
Pollution markets represent one of the most important, novel, and 
effective ways the EPA has improved the nation’s air quality over the 
past fifty years. The EPA and state and local governments have used 
Clean Air Act pollution markets to dramatically reduce airborne lead 
concentrations, emissions of SO2, and emissions of ozone precursors. 
The positive experiences with cap-and-trade and tradable credit 
programs have contributed to the proliferation of markets to reduce 
pollution, promote renewable energy, and increase energy efficiency 
across the United States and around the world. 
The expanded use of pollution markets reflects, in part, the analyses 
of their performance conducted by independent researchers. Such 
research provided the evidence from which policy entrepreneurs could 
draw when applying pollution markets to new pollution problems. The 
substantial improvement in the rigor of scholarly research on regulatory 
performance—through the integration of causal-inference techniques—
can also inform the institutionalization of regulatory performance 
evaluations in the EPA. Designing and implementing rules to enable 
retrospective analyses can produce information about the realized 
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environmental outcomes, public-health impacts, benefits, costs, labor-
market impacts, and other factors. The academic literature provides a 
roadmap for the design of evaluation and data-collection frameworks. 
Understanding whether pollution markets and environmental 
regulations deliver on their stated goals, do so cost-effectively, and 
increase social welfare can lead to improvements in environmental 
policy. In cases where regulations are delivering on their objectives in a 
low-cost manner, such analyses can demonstrate to the public that 
environmental regulations are bettering people’s lives. In cases where 
regulations fall short, the insights from the retrospective analysis can 
drive new rule-makings or highlight opportunities for Congress to revise 
environmental laws to enhance their effectiveness. 
